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NOTES
Fear, Discrimination and Dying
in the Workplace:' AIDS and
the Capping of Employees'
Health Insurance Benefits
"Most significantly, there were the first glimmers of awareness that the
future would always contain this strange new word. AIDS would
become a part of American culture and indelibly change the course of
our lives."
2
INTRODUCTION
The year 1981 saw the first reported case of acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome ("AIDS") in the United States.3 As of
September 30, 1992, at least 242,146 cases of AIDS and 160,372 deaths
from AIDS had been reported to the United States Center for Disease
' The title was borrowed from a statement by Lee Smith, chairman of the National
Leadership Coalition on AIDS, as quoted in Ron Stodghill II, Managing AIDS: How One
Boss Struggled to Cope, Bus. WK., Feb. 1, 1993, at 48 ("I was not trained to manage
fear, discrimination, and dying in the workplae.").
2 RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON xxi (1987).
3 Willie L. Brown, Jr., ADS: The Public Policy Imperative, 7 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 11, 11 (1988). There is, however, some evidence that isolated outbreaks of AIDS
occurred in the United States prior to 1981. See Mary C. Dunlap, AIDS and
Discrimination in the United States: Reflections on the Nature of Prejudice in a firus,
34 VLL. L. REV. 909, 910 n.6 (1989) (recounting the story of doctors finding the AIDS
virus in blood samples and tissues of a fifteen-year old African American who died in St.
Louis, Missouri, in 1969) (citing Crewdson, AIDS Thought to Be Cause of 1969 Death,
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER, Oct. 25, 1987, at Al); Marc J. Sicklick & Ayre Rubinstein,
A Medical Review ofAIDS, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 6 (1985) (speculating that the first
case in the United States may have occurred in 1977); id at 6 n.12 (noting that the first
manifestation of AIDS may have been in 1959 when a Haitian man in Brooklyn
developed a pneumocystic carindi pneumonia).
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Control and Prevention ("CDC").4 Additionally, the CDC estimates that
approximately one million Americans have been infected by the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV").' Of this group, some estimates indicate
4 See, e.g., Health Officials Discuss Guidelines for Reporting AIDS, UPI, Jan. 27,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (indicating that by 1995 the AIDS
death toll will be at least 330,000, while between 515,000 and 635,000 will have been
diagnosed as having AIDS); Amanda Husted, 330,000 Americans WillDiefriom AIDS by
1995, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Jan. 15, 1993, at D3. These projections take into account
the CDC's recently expanded definition of AIDS. See infra note 5.
3 Update: Public Health Surveillance for HIY Infection-United States, 1989 and
1990, 39 MoRmlDry & MORTAIXrY WKLY. REP. 853, 853 (1990). HIV is the virus that
ultimately causes AIDS. See, e.g., AIDS COORDINATION COMMc, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, AIDS: THE LEGAL IssuES 8 (Discussion Draft 1988) [hereinafter ABA
AIDS REPORT].
According to current CDC classification schemes, there are four stages of HIV
infection. See idi at 12. The first stage, which frequently occurs shortly after infection,
involves "a short-tem febrile illness with symptoms of acute infection" Id. The second
stage is asymptomatic HIV infection during which the infected person shows no signs of
infection. Id. The third stage is characterized by a compromising of the immune system;
however, the symptoms may vary from no more than persistently swollen lymph glands
to diarrhea, night sweats, weight loss, shortness of breath, malaise and persistent fever.
Id: The final stage is AIDS, which is defined as HIV infection coupled with certain
opportunistic infections. Id. See also DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SmViCES,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Sy ntrome-United
States, 1981-1988, 38 MORBIDITY & MORTALTY WKLY. REP. 229, 229 (1989), reprinted
in REPORTS ON HIV/AIDS: JANUARY-DEEBER 1989 15, 15 (1990) (defining AIDS).
The CDC further categorizes persons within the fourth stage according to the types of
symptoms that they presently exhibit. See ABA AIDS REPORT, supra, at 12. HIV
infection is also frequently classified as a three-stage, syndrome-asymptomatic HIV
infection, AIDS-related complex and acute AIDS. See, e.g., Joyce N. Hoffman &
Elizabeth Z. Kincaid, AIDS: The Challenge to Life and Health Insurers' Freedom of
Contract, 35 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 713-15 (1987). The only difference in these two
classification systems is the latter's absence of short-term febrile illness.
As of January 1, 1993, the CDC uses an expanded definition of AIDS. See 1993
Revised Classification System for HIV Infection and Expanded Surveillance Case
Definition for ALDS Among Adolescents and Adults, 41 MORBIDrrY & MORTALnT WKLY.
REP.: RECOMMENDATIONS AND RPTS. 1, 6 (1992); AIDS Surveillance Case Definition, 268
JAMA 2634, 2634 (1992). This revised definition, when coupled with HIV infection,
increases from twenty-three to twenty-six the total number of opportunistic infections that
constitute AIDS. AIDS Surveillance Case Definition, supra, at 6. The three new infections
are pulmonary tuberculosis, HIV-related severe immunosuppression and invasive cervical
cancer. Id. at 6-7. The CDC's inclusion of persons suffering from HIV-related severe
immunosuppression (i.e., those HIV-infected persons with CD4+ T-lymphocyte counts
less than 200 cells per cubic milliliter of blood, id at 6) will significantly increase the
number of persons diagnosed with AIDS. See Center for Disease Control and Prevention,
Projections of the Number of Persons Diagnosed with AIDS and the Number of
Immunosuppressed HIV-Infected Persons-United States, 1992-1994, 269 JAMA 733, 733
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that as many as half will develop AIDS within two to ten years of becoming
infected.' The true horror of these numbers becomes clear with the
recognition that vitually all AIDS patients die within five years of
diagnosis.'
In addition to the toll in human lives, AIDS continues to extract a great
economic cost. The most devastating cost of AIDS may be health care." The
average lifetime health care costs per AIDS victim ranges between $75,000
and $85,000.? Moreover, as medical technology increases the life expectancy
of HI V-infected persons, the health care costs associated with IV will also
increase.'" Since the magnitude of these costs would deplete most victims'
personal resources," the usual sources for the finds used to cover these
costs are private health insurance, employer-provided group health insurance,
and government assistance.'
(1993) (estimating that the inclusion of HIV-related severe immunosuppression should
account for a seventy-five percent increase in the number of AIDS cases reported in
1993). The CD4+ T-lymphocyte count is a white blood cell count that indicates the
degree of damage sustained by the immune system. See Mike McKee, A Cloud Within
the Silver Lining, RECORDER, Mar. 4, 1993, at 1. For a more detailed discussion of the
epidemiology of AIDS, see ABA AIDS REPORT, supra, at 8-12.
"See, e.g., Dunlap, suqra note 3, at 912 n.10 (listing the sources for these
estimates).
7 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEPARTMENT OP' HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES,
AIDS and Hwnan Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: 1988 Update,
38 MORBIDrIY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 3 (Supp. 1989).
' The estimated cost of AIDS health care for 1991 is between $2.2 billion and $8.5
billion. Comelis A. Rietmeijer et al., Cost of Care for Patients with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection, 153 ARcHIVES INTERNAL MED. 219, 219 (1993). The
variation depends upon which estimate of the lifetime health care costs of AIDS is used.
See infra note 9.
9 See Mike McKee, Was Insurance Cap Illegal?, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 4, 1993, at 12.
Over the years, there has been significant variance in the estimated lifetime medical costs
of AIDS. For instance, in 1986 the estimated lifetime hospital cost of AIDS was reported
as $147,340. Rietmeijer et al., supra note 8, at 219. This figure has been repeatedly
refuted. Instead, the estimated average lifetime health care cost of AIDS is generally
between $35,000 to $90,000. Id.
10 See, e.g., Karen Goldberg, Survving Despite HV: As Their Life Expectancy
Grows, So Do Needs of AIDS Patients, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1993, at Al (discussing.
the increased health care costs of AIDS patients).
" This depletion of resources may be especially likely now that the demographics
of AIDS has "shifted from a generally affluent population of young Caucasian
homosexual males ... to an increasingly inner-city population of poorer black and
Hispanic heterosexual[s]." Raymond C. O'Brien, The Legislative Initiative: The Ryan
White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990, 7 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL'Y 183, 183 (1991).
'2 NATIONAL COMM'N ON AIDS, AMERICA LIvING wITH AIDS 70 (1991).
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Insurance companies employ various underwriting tactics"3 to curtail
an IRV-infected person's access to private health insurance. 4 This,
coupled with the prohibitive costs of private health insurance, may
explain why "[t]he primary vehicle through which persons with AIDS
obtain health insurance is employer-sponsored group health insurance
plans."'5
The main source of funds, however, continues to be government
assistance." Indeed, commentators refer to this trend as the
" The term "umderwriting!' refers to an insurer's determination of the proposed
insured's risk of loss to the insurer. If the risk is too great, the insurer will not underwrite;
that is, the insurer will deny coverage. See Hoffman & Kincaid, supra note 5, at 715-17.
The risk factors relevant to underwriting health insurance for persons suspected of being
infected with HIV fall within two categories: life style factors and the use of HIV
antibody testing. Id. at 722.
The life style factors considered in underwriting include geographical location of
residence, marital status, occupation, and beneficiary selection. Id. at 723. For instance,
one insurance company developed an "AIDS Profile," which segregated insurance
applications of 'single males without dependents that are engaged in occupations that do
not require physical exertion.' Benjamin Schatz, The AIDS Insurance Cisis:
Underwriting or Overreaching?, 100 HARe. L. REv. 1782, 1787 (1987). Occupations
included in the list are '"restaurant employees, antique dealers, interior decorators,
consultants, florists, and people in the jewelry or fashion business."' Id. Even attorneys
for the insurance industry have admitted that "the use of stereotypical factors ... may
have little reliability as indicators of the applicant's sexual preference." Hoffman &
Kincaid, supra note 5, at 723.
It is quite common for insurance companies to use AIDS antibody tests as part of
their underwriting process. See, e.g., id. at 726-27. Some jurisdictions have enacted bans
on using such tests to determine insurability, id. at 726 n.84, but "[t]he insurance industry
has been remarkably, if not uniformly, successful in its drive to use HI1-antibody
testing." Peter Hiam, Insurers, Consumers, and Testing: The AIDS Experience, 15 L
MED. & HEALTH CARE 212, 220 (1987).
4 See Eric C. Sohlgren, Note, Group Health Benefits Discrimination Against AIDS
ictlims: Falling Through the Gaps of Federal Law-ERI , the Rehabilitation Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 24 LOY. LA. L. REV. 1247, 1255 (1991). Insurance
companies also engage in various tactics to resist payment of AIDS-related claims. See
Schat7, supra note 13, at 1786. This has been referred to as "postclaim underwriting." Id.
'5 Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1254-55. Note, however, that the majority of
Americans with health insurance obtain such coverage through participation in group
plans. See Edward E. Hollowell & James E. Eldridge, AIDS and the Insurance Industy:
The Debate Within the Debate, 10 J. LEGAL MED. 77, 80 (1989). The prevalence of
employer-sponsored health insurance may be a result of the fact that the age of most
AIDS victims falls within the prime employment years. See Hany R. Adams, Financial
Problems Inherent in the Admission of AIDS Patients into Long Term Care Facilities, 10
J. LEGAL MED. 89, 100 (1989) (noting that eighty-eight percent of AIDS patients are
between the ages of twenty and forty-nine).
6 See Sohigren, supra note 14, at 1255 ("When [AIDS] patients become disabled,
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'Medicaidization" of AIDS.7 A five-year study of New York, San
Francisco and Los Angeles found that "Medicaid finances a much larger
proportion of inpatient care for AIDS than other illnesses, and that during
the epidemic years, Medicaid's share increased while that of private
insurance declined."'"
To circumvent the barriers to obtaining private health insurance, HIV-
infected persons have traditionally sought employment with companies
offering large group insurance plans, 9 because group insurance plans
rarely require individual underwriting in order to obtain coverage.0 This
safe haven, however, is retreating. Instead of providing group insurance,
increased numbers of employers provide health insurance coverage
through self-fumding plans.2' This allows the employer to maintain
control of the plan and reduce administrative costs while circumventing
state laws regulating the insurance industry, including state AIDS
discrimination laws.
As a result of this switch to self-insured benefit plans, the costs
associated with insuring health care for BIV-infected persons are shifting
they often lose their jobs and insurance. As a result, funds are rapidly depleted and many
of them become eligible for public assistance.").
" See Jesse Green & Peter S. Amo, The "Medicaidization" of AIDS Trends in the
Financing of HIV-Related Medcal Care, 246 JAMA 1261, 1264 (1990); O'Brien, supra
note 11, at 184.
', Green & Amo, supra note 17, at 1264.
'9 See, e.g., Mark Scherzer, Insurance, in AIDS PRACnCE MANUAL VIII-2 (2d ed.
1988).
" ABA AIDS REPORT, supra note 5, at 116. Indeed, one commentator has remarked
that "the ideal circumstanm for an AIDS victim is to be employed and covered by a
company insurance policy when he learns that he has contracted AIDS." Tammie L.
Follet, Note, AIDS: An Inwsrable Hanaicap, 9 HAMLE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 117, 123
(1988).
1 See Legal Experts Say ADA Will Mean New Areas of AIDS-Related Litigation in
the 1990s, AIDS PoL'Y & L., Aug. 8, 1990, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Legal Experts Say]. The
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") covers self-funded
insurance plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). Self-funding refers to the "employer
taking total financial responsibility and risk for providing plan benefits, as opposed to an
insurance company assuming all or part of the financial responsibility and risk. Sohlgren,
supra note 14, at 1251 n.10. However, employers often purchase stop-loss intrance to
insure against losses above a specified dollar amount. Id.
' Scherzer, supra note 19, at VIII-2; Wendy K. Mariner, Problems with Employer-
Provided Health Insurance-The Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Health
Care Reform, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682, 1683 (1992); Legal Experts Say, supra note
21, at 2. A self-funding employer may avoid state laws because ERISA preempts state
law relating to employee benefits. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990);
see also infra notes 80-111 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA preemption).
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from insurance companies to employersOrs Consequently, employers are now
seeking to avoid these costs 4 One method of cost avoidance is to place a
cap on the total amount of health benefits that an employee may recover as
a result of HIV infection or AIDS' This method has survived judicial
challenge under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
("FRISA") 6 Not surprisingly, the capping of insurance benefits has become
a viable alternative to employers faced with the rising costs of health care 7
The current issue is whether, as a matter of policy, employers should be able
to cap the health benefits of a group considering the significant stigma already
attached to being a member of that group.2
This Note addresses the validity of limiting the health insurance benefits
of persons infected with EIV. First, the Note considers the validity of such
benefit capping under ERISA and uses two reported cases" as a mechanism
2 While addressing the National Leadership Coalition on AIDS, Senator Frank R.
Lautenberg (D-NJ) stated that AIDS costs American businesses $50 billion per year.
Impact of AIDS on American Business Called "Fundamental" by Lautenberg, AIDS
PoL'Y & L., Nov. 14, 1991, at 7.
'4 See James R. Bruner, Note, AIDS and ERISA Preemption: The Double Threat, 41
DUKE L.J. 1115, 1128 (1992) ("Employers with self-insured health plans have replaced
the commercial insurance industry in this conflict with PWAs [persons with AIDS]. The
motivations of the insurance industry in the battle over [AIDS antibody] testing are now
the motivations of employers with self-insured group health plans.").
' See, e.g., Ron Stodghill II, Why AIDS Policy Must Be a Special Policy, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 1, 1993, at 53, 54 (recounting the story of an Atlanta firm that decreased its lifetime
AIDS-related benefits from $1 million to $25,000); Michele Zaros, AIDS and Insurance:
No Guarantees-Self-Insured Companies Can Now Limit Coverage for Catastrophic
Illness, 20 HUM. RTS. 18, 20 (Winter 1993) (reporting that an employer reduced the
lifetime AIDS-related benefits for an employee from $1 million to $40,000).
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) [hereinafter ERISA]. The Fifth Circuit recently
upheld an employer's capping of lifetime health insurance benefits available to AIDS
patients from $1 million to $5,000. McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied sub nom. Greenburg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
Some practicing attorneys believe that the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari dealt a
deathblow to the ERISA issue in capping cases. McKee, supra note 5, at 13.
' Indeed, one study indicated that at least eighteen employers have reduced or
eliminated insurance benefits for persons with AIDS. See Mariner, supra note 22, at 1683.
' See Stodghill, supra note 25, at 54 (discussing an employer's refusal to allow an
AIDS seminar to be conducted because the employer did not want his customers to think
he hired "those kind of people").
" See McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub
nom. Greenburg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992); Owens v. Storehouse, Inc.,
773 F. Supp. 416 (N.D. Ga. 1991). The case Westhoven v. Lincoln Foodservice Products,
Inc., 616 N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), also deals with this issue. In Westhoven, the
Indiana Civil Rights Commission held that Indiana's fair-employment statute prohibited
AIDS-related health benefit caps. Id. at 780. On appeal to the circuit court, the judge
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for examining the specific ERISA issues." Second, the Note determines
the effect that the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA")3'
has on the issue." Finally, the Note explores the policy issues involved
in limiting the health benefits of HIV-infected persons and suggests how
the current statutory scheme can be altered to provide regulation of self-
insured employee health benefit plans.
I. ERISA's RESPONSE
One of the express purposes of ERISA: is to protect "the continued
well-being and security of millions of employees and their dependents
[who are] directly affected by [employee benefit] plans."3 To effectuate
this purpose, ERISA regulates health benefits, pensions and other fringe
benefits of employment. ERISA uses the specific phrase "employee
welfare benefit plans" to cover employer-provided group health insurance
plans.3 In order to determine the applicability of ERISA. to an
employer's capping of the health benefits of employees suffering from
AIDS, this Note will examine two reported cases that deal with this issue.
A. McGann v. H & H Music Co.'
After working for H & H Music Company ("H & H Music") for five
years, John McGann was diagnosed as having AIDS.' At the time- of
McGann's diagnosis, H & H Music was providing its employees with
found the commission to be without jurisdiction and entered judgment in favor of Lincoln
Foodservice. Id. at 778. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed such a result after holding
that ERISA preempted the Indiana civil rights law. Id. at 784.
30 See infra notes 34-117 and accompanying text.
31 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1991) [hereinafter ADA].
3 See infra notes 118-59 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 160-240 and accompanying text.
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
31 Id. § 1001(a).
' Id. § 1002(1). This term encompasses "any plan, find, or program ... maintained
by an employer ... for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries,
through the purchase of insurance or otherwise ... medical, surgical, or hospital care or
benefits, or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability, [or] death." Id. A plan
participant includes "any employee or former employee or an employer ... who is or
may become eligible to receive a benefit of any type from an employee benefit plan
which covers employees of such employer." Id. § 1002(7).
3' McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cer. denied sub nom.
Greenburg v. H & H Music Co., 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
38 Id. at 403.
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maximum health benefits of $1 million through a group insurance plan
purchased from General American Life Insurance Company.9 Seven
months after McGann's diagnqsis, H & H Music switched its health
insurance plan from a purchased plan to a self-insured plan. Along with
this change of insurance plans, H & H reduced the maximum health
benefit coverage for persons with AIDS to $5,000. Although the
employer made other changes to the plan, no similar benefit limitation
was placed on any other catastrophic illness."
McGann brought suit alleging that H & H Music's capping of AIDS-
related benefits violated the two prohibitions of section 510 of ERISA.'
Section 510, in relevant part, provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline, or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an
employee benefit plan, .. or for the purpose of interfering with the
attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled
under the plan....42
The district court, however, dismissed McGann's action and granted H &
H's motion for summary judgment.43
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal.4 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that
under either section 510 claim McGann had to demonstrate that H & H
Music had a specific intent to discriminate.4 According to the court,
McGann failed to provide evidence of discrimination sufficient to survive
a motion of summary judgment.' This result rested on H & H Music's
representation that it had implemented the cap for cost containment
purposes.47
McGann has been interpreted as holding that an employer can escape
ERISA's prohibitions against discrimination by merely alleging that it
39 Id.
o Id. The other changes to the insurance coverage included elimination of coverage
for chemical dependency treatment, increased individual and family deductibles, adoption
of a prefered provider plan, and increased contribution requirments. Id. at 403 nl.
4' Id. at 403; see 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
4 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
4 McGann, 946 F.2d at 408.
0 Id.
41 Id. at 404.
46 at 408.
4 Id. at 406.
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instituted the AIDS-related benefit cap to reduce costs.O Such a broad
interpretation, however, fails to consider that McGann, in order to
withstand a motion for summary judgment, had the burden of providing
evidence sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the employee's specific intent to discriminate.49
Hence, on its facts, McGann stands for the proposition that a plaintiff
must specifically assert discriminatory intent in order to withstand a
motion for summary judgment.
The court's fact-finding represents a more distressing aspect of the
McGann decision. Despite McGann's being the only employee affected
by the new policy and the court's assumption that McGann's diagnosis
was the motivating factor for H & H Music's reduction of coverage, the
court found that H & H Music had no specific intent to discriminate.
5
0
Moreover, the court failed to consider evidence of prevalent
discrimination against persons diagnosed with AIDS" and dismissed the
fact that AIDS was the only catastrophic illness for which benefits under
the plan were limited.'
The court's findings of fact seem predicated on the belief that ERISA
leaves employers "free to create, modify and terminate the terms and
conditions of employee benefits."' For the court, this freedom mandates
a narrow interpretation of the term "discrimination." Accordingly, in
the court's view, ERISA "does not prohibit an employer from electing not
to cover or continue to cover AIDS, while covering or continuing to
cover other catastrophic illnesses, even though the employer's decision in
' See, e.g., Alicia Roberts, High Court Lets &and Ruling That ERSA Allows Firms
to Cut Benefits for Particular Diseases, MANAGED CARE L. OtrrLoox, Nov. 24, 1992,
at 1.
4. S'ee Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 321 (1986). This burden is a result of
the fact that McGann must prove discrimination at trial. Id.
McGann, 946 F.2d at 404 & n.4.
a See infra notes 189-202 and accompanying text (discussing several studies that
provide proof of discrimination and its effects).
2 McGann, 946 F.2d at 405. In generalizing McGan's position, the court declared
that "[u]nder McGann's theory, any reduction in employee benefits would be
impermissibly discriminatory if motivated by a desire to avoid the anticipated costs of
continuing to provide coverage for a particular beneficiary." Id.
Id. at 407. This premise derives from the Supreme Court's statement that "ERISA
does not mandate that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself
proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits." Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). The McGann court, however, specifically declared that it
was not deciding the question of whether an employer has an absolute right to modify its
plan absent a contractual limitation on that right. McGann, 946 F.2d at 406 n.8.
m McGann, 946 F.2d at 407.
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this respect may stem from some 'prejudice' against AIDS or its victims
generally.
55
Unfortunately, case law supports such a narrow interpretation of
discrimination. As a general rule, section 510 prohibits an employer from
taking action that would be impermissible under the terms of its plan.ss
Hence, if there exists no cap in the plan, H & H Music could not refuse
payment because to do so would constitute discrimination. However,
section 510 provides no prohibition against a plan's discriminating
between diseasesY Thus, the Fifth Circuit "correctly" applied section
510 by holding that McGann must establish more than merely a
modification of the plan in order to succeed under section 510. Indeed,
precedent holds that a welfare benefit plan modification that "cuts along
independently established lines ... and that has a readily apparent
business justification, demonstrates no invidious intent."
Lastly, the McGann court declared that section 510's prohibition
against, an employer's action that interferes with an employee's attainment
of any right to which such participant may become entitled only prevents
an employer from withholding either benefits capable of vesting or
promised benefits.59 ERISA's vesting requirements do not apply to
employee welfare benefit plans; McGann, therefore, had to show that H
& H Music had promised permanent coverage.' Because McGann failed
to allege that H & H Music had promised permanent coverage, and
"Id. at 408.
See Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 577 (1978) (holding that proof
of a justification for refusing to hire a job applicant that is reasonably related to the
employer's achievement of a legitimate goal does not violate Title VII).
s7See Deeming v. American Standard, Inc., 905 F.2d 1124, 1127-28 (7th Cir. 1990)
(holding that "a mere elimination of a 'creep'provision does not support a § 510 claim");
Aronson v. Servus Rubber Div. of Chromalloy, 730 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir.) (holding that
a termination made for business purposes does not involve invidious intent), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1017 (1984).
"Aronson, 730 F.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
'9 MCGanm, 946 F.2d at 405.
60 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(19) (1988); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 91 (1983) (noting that ERISA's vesting requirements only apply to pension plans).
Congress believed that vesting requirements for welfare plans "would seriously complicate
the administration and increase the costs of plans whose primay function is to provide
retirement income." S. REP. No. 383, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CA-N. 4890, 4935; see also H.R. Rm'. No. 807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4670 (offering a general discussion of the problems
associated with vested rights and funds under ERISA). The logic seems to be that the
increased costs associated with vesting welfare plans would discourage employers from
offering any insurance benefits.
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because the plan reserved H & H Music' right to modify the plan, the court
concluded that H & H Music did not violate any right to which McGann was
entitled."' The court justified this conclusion by noting that a contrary result
would, in effect, vest welfare benefit plans immediately upon enactment'
a result contrary to congressional intent.
B. Owens v. Storehouse, Inc."
In April of 1988, Storehouse adopted an employee welfare benefit plan
that included lifetime health benefits of $1 million." By November of 1988,
five employees of Storehouse had been diagnosed with AIDS. In order to
procure stop-loss insurance, Storehouse switched to a self-insured plan and
capped its AIDS-related coverage at $25,000. After enacting the benefit
limitation, Storehouse continued to pay over $90,000 worth of Owens' claims
in excess of the $25,000 cap because the costs of its new plan were running
behind its budget. Further, upon notifying Owens that it would begin to
adhere to its new policy, Storehouse provided Owens with an additional
$7,500 of coverage." Thereafter, Owens brought an action seeking a
temporary restraining order to prevent Storehouse from implementing the
cap.
67
Similar to the court in McGann, the court in Owens upheld the validity
of the employer's capping of AIDS-related health insurance benefits. In
affirming the district court's opinion, the Eleventh Circuit resolved the case
solely on Owens' section 510 claim." The district court's opinion, however,
addresses several important ERISA issues that the McGann opinion did not
address and is, therefore, worthy of discussion.
1. The Employer's Fiduciary Obligations
to ERISA Participants
Owens alleged that Storehouse's capping of AIDS-related insurance
benefits constituted a breach of Storehouse's fiduciary duty.69 Under
McGann, 946 F.2d at 405.
'Id.
984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 396.
Id. Storehouse also capped lifetime health benefits for mental illness and substance
abuse ($25,000), growth hormone drugs ($10,000), temporomandibulr joint dysfimction
($2,500) and nicotine dependence ($500). Id. at 397 n.3.
6 Id. at 397.
6id.
SId. at 397-400.
Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416, 419 (N.D. Ga. 1991), aftd, 984 F.2d
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ERISA, an employer who administers an employee welfare benefit plan
acts in a fiduciary capacity towards the plan's participants." As a
fiduciary, the employer is obligated to "discharge his duties with respect
to a plan solely in the interest of the participants ... for the exclusive
purpose of... providing benefits to participants."'" Thus, this fiduciary
duty requires the employer to administer the plan in accordance with the
plan's documents.7
Normally, an analysis of an employer's alleged violation of ERISA's
fiduciary obligation consists of a three-step inquiry. First, is the employer
a fiduciary?73 Second, does the employer's action fall within the scope
of her fiduciary obligations?74 Third, did the employer act as a
reasonable person in discharging her fiduciary obligations?75 Each
question must be answered affirmatively before proceeding to the next
inquiry. Since the parties in Owens appeared to have stipulated that
Storehouse was a fiduciary, however, the court resolved this issue by
summarily finding that Storehouse's modification of its health benefit plan
was not a function of administering its plan.7" This result is consistent
with prior case law holding that an employer acts in his fiduciary capacity
when he "decides matters required in plan administration or involving
obligations imposed upon the administrator by the plan," but not when
the employer is making business decisions not otherwise regulated by
ERISA.78 The court further recognized that the result would have been
different if the benefits had been vested.79
394 (11th Cir. 1993).
70 Payonk v. HMW Indus., 883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989).
71 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1988).
2 Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
73 Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1281.
7 Payonk, 883 F.2d at 225; see Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1281 n.21.
7' Payonk 883 F.2d at 225; Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1281. The actual standard
of care isthat of areasonable person inlike circumstances. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(B)
(1988).
76 Owens, 773 F. Supp. at 419.
7 Payonk, 883 F.2d at 225.
' Id.; see also Young v. Standard Oil, 849 F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir.) (holding that
an employer does not breach its fiduciary duty by amending its employee welfare benefit
plan), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 981 (1988); Witmeyer v. Kilroy, 788 F.2d 1021, 1024-25
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that trustees do not breach their fiduciary duty when retirement
plan amendments that the trustees have adopted meet general ERISA requirements);
Sutton v. Weirton Steel Div. of Nat'1 Steel Corp., 724 F.2d 406, 410-11 (4th Cir. 1983)
(holding that an employer does not violate its fiduciary duty if its plan is not subject to
ERISA's vesting requirements), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1205 (1984).
7 Owens, 773 F. Supp. at 419. For a discussion of ERISA vesting requirements, see
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2. ERISA's Preemption of State Claims
The court also granted Storehouse's motion for summary judgment on
Owens' state claims. Owens had alleged that the capping of AIDS
benefits constituted an unfair employment practice under Georgia law and
had sought recovery on a tort theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress." To evaluate the court's holding that ERISA preempted these
state claims," an examination of the United States Supreme Court's
evolving body of ERISA preemption law is necessary.
ERISA expressly preempts state law." Section 514 provides that
ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may...
relate to any employee benefit plan."" Preemption was thought
necessary to insure a comprehensive and uniform approach to employee
pension and welfare benefit plans. 5 The Supreme Court has broadly
interpreted section 514 to mean that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan ... if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan."" Hence, section 514 preempts even those state laws that have
only an indirect effect on employee benefit plans."
Section 514's "saving clause," which exempts from preemption "any
law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities,"
creates an exception to the general rule." This exception to preemption,
however, is limited by the deemer clause. For purposes of state laws
regulating insurance, the deemer clause prohibits employee benefit plans
supra note 60.
80 Owens, 773 F. Supp. at 419-20.
tId.
"Id.
83 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988). This is only one of three ways in which federal law can
preempt state law. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-100 (1983); English
v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990). Federal law also preempts state law
when (1) federal law is so pervasive in the specific regulatory area that it can be said to
"occupy the field" and (2) an actual conflict exists between state and federal law. English,
496 U.S. at 79. This is a rather simplified approach to federal preemption. For a more
detailed examination, see Susan S. Grover, The Employer's Fetal Injwy Quandary After
Johnson Controls, 81 KY. L.J. 639, 652-56, 659-71 (1992-93).
"29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988).
t See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
u Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
rd.; see, e.g., R.R. Donnelly & Sons Co. v. Prevost, 915 F.2d 787, 788 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that ERISA preempts state law that requires employers to continue welfare
coverage of employees who are eligible for worker's compensation benefits because
ERISA indirectly regulates the employee benefit plan), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1415 (1991).
' 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
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from being deemed "to be an insurance company or other insur... or to
be engaged in the business of insurance" 9 Not surprisingly, courts have
experienced difficulty in ascertaining the proper relationship between the
deemer clause and the savings clause?
Judicial resolution of this issue ultimately depended on distinguishing
between insured and self-insured benefit plans9 This distinction was first
addressed in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts.Y In
Metropolitan Life, the Court held that the savings clause covered a
Massachusetts statute requiring minimum mental health care benefits in group
health insurance.policies.93 That is, the Court concluded that the statute
regulated insurance and not employee welfare benefits. The effect on
employee welfare benefits was merely the indirect result of regulating
insurance.
In support of its conclusion the Court noted that had Congress intended
to preempt state regulation of insurance contracts, "it would have been
unnecessary for the deemer clause explicitly to exempt such laws from the
saving clause when they are applied directly to benefit plans. 9  In effect,
Metropolitan Life reconciled the savings and deemer clauses by distinguishing
between the situation in which the employer pays for the employees'benefits
(self-insured plans) and the situation in which the employer obtains insurance
to pay for the employees'benefits (insured plans). Accordingly, insured plans
are subject to indirect regulation by the states via direct regulation of the
insurance companies, while self-insured plans are free from direct and indirect
state regulation?'
The Court further clarified this distinction in FMC Corp. v. Holliday.'
In FMC Corp., the employer sought subrogation of an employee's out-of-
89 Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95 (noting disagreement among the lower courts regarding
the scope of preemption under ERISA).
"' For a more exhaustive examination of the judicial treatment of ERISA's
preemption provisions, see Bruner, supra note 24, at 1133-55; Sohlgren, supra note 14,
at 1261-71.
471 U.S. 724 (1985). The Metropolitan Life decision is credited with spurring the
increased popularity of self-insured employee welfare benefit plans. See Bruner, supra
note 24, at 1130; see also supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text (discussing
employers' shift to self-insured plans).
93 Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 758.
Id. at 743.
9s Id. at 741. According to the Court, two other reasons justified its result: (1) the
plain language of the statute supported a finding that benefit laws regulate insurance and
not welfare benefit plans, id. at 739-40; and (2) under federal statutes, state-mandated
benefit laws constitute the "business of insurance." Id. at 742-44.
Id. at 747.
97 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1990).
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court settlement for medical costs paid by the employer."8 The self-
insured employee welfare benefit plan provided for this right of
subrogation." The employer sought to prevent reimbursement by
invoking Pennsylvania's anti-subrogation statute." The Court held that
ERISA preempted Pennsylvania's statute and, in so doing, reversed the
Third Circuit's decision.''
The Court analyzed the Pennsylvania anti-subrogation statute
according to ERISA's three-step preemption inquiry." Consistent with
the Shaw Court's broad interpretation of ERISA preemption, 3 the
Court concluded that the Pennsylvania statute fell within the scope of
ERISA preemption." The Court then found that the statute regulated
insurance and was thus within the scope of the savings clause.' 5 Most
importantly, the Court reaffirmed Metropolitan Life in holding that
ERISA, by way of the deemer clause, preempted state regulation of self-
insured ERISA plans." The Court explained its application of the
savings and deemer clauses to self-insured and insured ERISA plans as
follows:
[S]elf-funded ERISA plans are exempt from state regulation insofar as
that regulation "relate[s] to" the plans. State laws directed toward the
plans are pre-empted because they relate to an employee benefit plan
but are not "saved" because they do not regulate insurance. State laws
that directly regulate insurance are "saved" but do not reach self-funded
employee benefit plans because the plans may not be deemed to be
insurance companies, other insurers, or engaged in the business of
insurance for purposes of such state laws. On the other hand, employee
benefit plans that are insured are subject to indirect state insurance
regulation. An insurance company that insures a plan remains an insurer
for purposes of state laws "purporting to regulate insurance" after
application of the deemer clause. The insurance company is therefore
9' Id. at 55.
"Id. at 54.
'9' Id. at 55.
"' Id. at 65.
See id. at 57. The steps are as follows: (1) Is the state law related to an employee
benefit plan, i.e., does the statute fall within the scope of ERISA's preemption provision?
(2) Does the state law regulate insurance, ie., does the statute fall within the scope of
ERISA's savings clause? (3) If so, is the statute brought back into ERISA's preemption
provision via the deemer clause? Id. at 57-58.
'9' See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
'9' FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 58-60.
'9' Id. at 60-61.
"'oId. at 61-65.
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not relieved from state insurance regulation. The ERISA plan is
consequently bound by state insurance regulations insofar as they apply
to the plan's insurer."7
Because the state statutes involved in Owens"' do not invoke
Metropolitan Life's self-insured and insured dichotomy, Owens presents an
easy case. Considering the Supreme Court broad construction of ERISA's
preemption provision, the issue becomes whether the state statutes relate to
an employee benefit plan. In other words, do the statutes have "a connection
with or reference to such a plan"?" In the Owens case, Owens attempted
to use Georgia's unfair employment practices provision to limit the employer's
right to modify an employee benefit plan. For this reason, the Owens court
correctly found the state provision to be preempted10 Likewise, Owens'
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, which represented an attempt
to impose additional duties on the employer with regard to its benefit plan,
was also preempted."'
C. Summary
Although the McGann and Owens decisions allow employers to engage
in outright discrimination against MIV-infected persons, as long as this
discrimination is not directed toward a particular individual, ERISA appears
to support these decisions. Indeed, ERISA, as drafted, is ill-equipped to attain
its lofty purpose" as it relates to employer-provided health benefits. In all
likelihood this failure of ERISA is a result of the fact that ERISA was
originally enacted to remedy the existing laws' deficiencies in protecting
employees' pension rights."3 Consequently, as one commentator remarked,
"[h]ealth benefits were placed under ERISA's exclusive governance almost
as an afterthought."" 4 This may explain why ERISA not only fails to
7Id. at 61. One commentator summarized the curent status of the ERISA
preemption doctrine by stating that ERISA preempts "both: (1) state insurance laws
purporting to regulate self-insured employee benefit plans; and (2) state employment
discrimination laws relating to employee benefit plans that do not regulate insurance,
whether such plans are insured or self-insured." Sohlgren, sipra note 14, at 1268
(footnotes omitted).
, See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
10 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
"o Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 416, 419-20 (N.D. Ga. 1991), aft'd, 984
F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993).
1 Id.
112 See uipra text accompanying note 35.
113 See H.R. REi'. No. 533, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.CAR.N. 4639, 4639.
114 Mariner, sura note 22, at 1684.
[Vol 82
AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE
require employers to offer health insurance, but also fails to provide any
substantive standards for employers who do provide health benefits."1 5
Moreover, the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of ERISA
preemption provisions thwarts states' efforts to provide a substantive
standard. Hence, to the extent that state law protects HIV-infected
persons' access to health care,"' FMC Corp. allows an employer, with
ERISA's blessings, to discriminate against HIV-infected persons."
II. THE ADA's RESPONSE
A. In General
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990"' extends the
protections of Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964119 to
individuals with disabilities. One of the stated purposes of the ADA is "to
provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities." 2 ' Specifically,
the ADA prohibits discrimination in employment."'
1. Defining Disability Under the ADA
Coverage under the ADA depends upon whether the individual has
a disability. For purposes of the ADA, an individual is disabled if any
one of the following circumstances is present:
11 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983) ("ERISA does not mandate
that employers provide any particular benefits, and does not itself proscribe discrimination
in the provision of employee benefits").
"6 Employment discrimination on the basis of disability or handicap is prohibited by
all states and the District of Columbia. See Sohigren, supra note 14, at 1248 n.6 (listing
each state's specific statutory provision). Likewise, a minority of jurisdictions prohibit
AIDS discrimination in health insurance coverage. See id. at 1250 n.7.
17 Several factors indicate that employers who limit benefits to BIV-infected persons
are not solely motivated by cost savings, but also by a discriminatory purpose. See infra
notes 208-11 and accompanying text
"' 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. 11 1991). The ADA went into effect on July
26, 1992. Id. § 12111. Currently, it covers all employers with twenty-five or more full-
time employees. Id. § 12111(5)(A). On July 26, 1994, however, the scope of the ADA
will expand to include all employers with fifteen or more full-time employees. Id. At least
one case has been filed to determine whether exclusion of health insurance coverage for
HIV-related illnesses violates the ADA. See Suit Seek to Exclude ALDS Health Coverage,
NAT'L L.J., Mar. 15, 1993, at 6.
m 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to a-6, 2000c to e-7 (1988).
Id. § 12101(b)(1) (Supp. m 1991).
' Id. § 12112.
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(1) The individual has "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities" of the
individual;m
(2) The individual has a record of having such an impairment;'
(3) The individual is regarded as having such an impairment.'
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has defined
physical or mental impairment broadly."S Furthermore, a determination
of whether a person is disabled should be made without reference to any
"mitigating measures" such as medication.'2 In addition to having a
physical or mental impairment, the impairment must also substantially
limit at least one major life activity to qualify as a disability. Major life
activities include functions such as "seeing, hearing, walking, speaking,
breathing, learning, performing manual tasks, and caring for oneself."'' 7
The "record of such an impairment" provision includes persons who
have recovered from impairments or who have been misclassified as
having an impairment." It has been suggested that "record" is not
limited to medical records, but could also include employment or
educational records." 9
The "regarded as having such an impairment" condition extends the
ADA's protection to persons who do not have an impairment.130 The
relevant inquiry is whether the individual is treated as having a disability.
A hypothetical situation involving AIDS illustrates this point: "Suppose
that an employer had discharged an employee in response to a groundless
rumor that the employee was infected with BIV. Although the rumor was
unfounded, the employer perceived the person as disabled and
discriminated on the basis of perceived disability by discharging the
employee."'
131
'Id. § 12102(2)(A).
123 Id.
'Id.
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (1992). For instance, the term "physical impairment'
includes "any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical
loss affecting one or more of the following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal,
special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, repmductive,
digestive, genitourinary, heroic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine." Id.
126 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (1991).
Rosemary E. Mahoney & Allan Cnbofsky, The Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990: Changes in Existing Protection and Impact on the Private Health Services
Provider, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 51, 57 (1992).
" 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(k).
Robert B. Fitzpatrick & E. Anne Benaroya, Americans with Disabilities Act and
AIDS, 8 LA1. LAW. 249, 255 (1992).
1" 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(1).
... Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra note 129, at 255.
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2. Discrimination in Employment
With respect to employment, the ADA prohibits discrimination on the
basis of disability against a "qualified individual with a disability ... in
regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.""l A "qualified
individual with a disability" is an "individual with a disability who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions
of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." '
The essence of an employer's obligation under the ADA is to provide,
upon request, reasonable accommodation, unless such accommodation
would create an undue hardship for the employer." Failure to provide
reasonable accommodation constitutes discrimination by the
employer.'3 The term "undue hardship" covers any action requiring
"significant difficulty or expense" when considered in light of several
relevant factors.'
B. Capping Health Benefits of Employees with AIDS Under the ADA
1. The ADA's Applicability to AIDS
The legislative history of the ADA clearly expresses the congressional
intent that the ADA cover HIV infection whether it be asymptomatic or
fully developed AIDS.37 Even without this legislative mandate,
3 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. 111 1991).
Id. § 12111(8).
'3 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
3 
Id.
L6 Id. § 12111(10)(A). These factors include the following: the basic nature and cost
of the accommodation; the overall size of the business, i.e., the number of employees and
the type and location of the facilities; the overall impact that the accommodation would
have on the facility needing the reasonable accommodation; and the type of operations
of the facility. Id. § 12111(10)(B)(i)-(iv). As these factors indicate, whether an
accommodation constitutes undue hardship will depend on the specific employer.
Fitzpatrick & Benaroya, supra note 129, at 261.
17 HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION & LABOR, AMEMCANS wrr DISAErrms Acr OF'
1990, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 1, 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.N. 303, 334 [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 485]. Likewise, the definition of
disability for purposes of the ADA was borrowed from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i(d) (1988). See AIDS: Covered Indirectly, CONG. WEEKLY REP.,
May 13, 1989, at 1123. The ADA applies a similar, if not greater, standard than that of
the Rehabilitation Act and its implementing regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). HIV
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however, HIV infection would be embraced in the ADA's definition of
disability."3 HIV infection substantially limits an infected person's
ability to procreate and to engage in intimate sexual relationships. Both
of these activities constitute major life activities under the ADA 9
2. The ADA 's Applicability to
Employer-Provided Insurance Benefits
The ADA specifically addresses the issue of employer-provided
insurance programs.14 While the ADA does not prevent an employer
or insurer from "establishing, sponsoring, observing or administering the
terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are based on underwriting risks,
classifying risks, or administering such risks that are based on or not
inconsistent with State law.., or that [are] not subject to State laws that
regulate insurance," 4 an employer's actions must be consistent with the
purposes behind the ADA. That is, an employer can take no action to
evade the purposes of ADA." For instance, the ADA prohibits an
employer from "participating in a contractual or other arangement or
relationship that has the effect of subjecting [an employer's] qualified...
employee with a disability to the discrimination prohibited [and] includes
... providing fringe benefits to any employee of the [employer]."'
143
The legislative history of section 501 of the ADA appears to provide
little hope for the HIV-infected employee whose health benefits are
capped. For instance, the House Education and Labor Committee Report
concludes:
In sum, section 501(c) is intended to afford to insurers and employers
the same opportunities they would enjoy in the absence of this
legislation to design and administer insurance product and benefit plans
in a manner that is consistent with basic principles of insurance risk
infection is widely believed to be a disability under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g.,
Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701, 704-05 (9th Cir. 1988). Indeed, even
the Justice Department has agreed that the Rehabilitation Act covers both asymptomatic
HIV infection and full-blown AIDS. Justice Department Memorandum on Application of
Rehabilitation Act's Section 504 to HIV-Infected Persons, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No.
195, at D-1 (Oct. 7, 1988).
S ee supra notes 122-31 and accompanying text.
' H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, supra note 137, at 52.
140 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
141 Id. § 12201(c)(2)-(3).
42 Id. § 12201(c).
'41 Id. § 12112(b)(2).
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classification. This legislation assures that decisions concerning the
insurance of persons with disabilities which are not based on bona fide
risk classification be made in conformity with non-discrimination
requirements. Without such a clarification, this legislation could
arguably find violative of its provisions any action taken by an insurer
or employer which treats disabled persons differently under an insurance
or benefit plan because they represent an increased hazard of death or
illness.'
Furthermore, with respect to self-insured group health plans, the
Committee stated that "self-insured plans, which are currently governed
by the preemption provisions of [ERISA], are still governed by the
preemption provision and... are subject to state law only to the extent
determined by the courts in their interpretation of ERISA's preemption
provision."
145
Against this background, however, one must consider the U.S.
Solicitor General's comments in his brief requesting a denial of certiorari
in McGann v. H & H Music" and arguing that the ADA better
addressed McGann's concerns. 47 The Senate Report also provides some
hope for LIV-infected persons whose health benefits are limited:
[W]hile a plan which limits certain kinds of coverage based on
classification of risk would be allowed under this section, the plan may
not refuse to insure, or refuse to continue to insure, or limit the amount,
extent, or kind of coverage available to an individual, or charge a
different rate for the same coverage solely because of a physical or
mental impairment, except where the refusal, limitation, or rate
differential is based on sound actuarial principles or is related to actual
or reasonably anticipated experience.149
These conflicting interpretations of the ADA reflect the need for
additional guidance on this issue. The EEOC is planning to issue further
guidance that will address the ADA's effect on insurance2 ° Along with
'"H.R. REP. No. 485, pt. 2, spra note 137, at 137-38.
145 Id. at 137.
' 946 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991), cer. denied sub nom. Greenburg v. H & H Music,
113 S. Ct. 482 (1992).
147 Myron D. Rumeld & Richard Brook, New Weapons? ADA May Widen IV
Coverage, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 24 (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 17-18).
14 See S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 29, 85 (1989).
149 Id. (emphasis added).
" EEOC Pondering Giddance for Employers on Insurance under Disabilities Act,
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these guidelines, the EEOC should define the terms "sound actuarial
principles" and "subterfuge."
In addressing these concerns, the EEOC should consider evidence that
such benefit-capping is usually done for reasons other than "sound actuarial
principles" or that the capping "is related to actual or reasonably anticipated
experiences.'' For instance, AIDS-related benefits are often the only
catastrophic illness benefits that are capped." Likewise, the fact that
employers cap health insurance benefits for EIV-infected persons while
allowing claims for more expensive illnesses suggests that the real basis for
such caps is a moral judgment or discriminatory intent."3 One commentator
has suggested that health insurance limits for AIDS patients are likely to be
motivated by "prejudice against gay men... [since] [t]here is still a
perception that AIDS is largely a gay male disease."'"
It however, the EEOC merely adopts insurance companies' definition of
sound actuarial principles, then actual or expected cost increases would almost
always justify AIDS coverage restrictions.55 Likewise, there are a number
of other recognized justifications for provisions that disparately impact
disabled individuals and would likely be upheld by the ADA, such as "pre-
existing conditions limitations, evidence of insurability provisions, and lower
coverage of mental or nervous disorders."'5
As one commentator has suggested, "[t]he precise impact of the ADA on
rles capping coverage will depend.., on the construction of ambiguous and
conflicting provisions of the statute and its underlying legislative history."'"
Possibly the only concrete statement that can be made concerning the ADA'
impact on the capping of insurance benefits is that such a limitation cannot
be upheld solely on moral justifications. 8 Therefore, the ADA has the
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 207, at A-11 (Oct. 25, 1991).
... See S. REP. No. 116, supra note 148, at 85.
2 See, e.g., Company May Place Cap on AIDS Benefits Without Violating ERI,
Judge Rides, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 140, at A-5 (July 20, 1990) ("If [the insurance
industry's] problem is money, why did they single out AIDS ... ? Why not say a
beneficiary can receive no more than 'WX?' dollars during their lifetime for any illness?")
(quoting Arthur Leonard, Professor of Law at New York Law School).
13 Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1259 n.60 (comparing the cost of AIDS health care
(between $50,000 and $100,000) with the costs of other illnesses, including autologous
bone marrow transplants (between $75,000 and $125,000), heart transplants ($150,000),
and liver transplants ($120,000)).
14 Briner, supra note 24, at 1125.
... Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1292; see also infra notes 229-40 and accompanying
text (noting that society's interest in insurance provides a justification for not leaving
actuarial classifications to the discretion of insurance companies).
"6 Sohlgren, supra note 14, at 1292.
"7 Rumeld & Brook, supra note 147, at 26.
'"Id. at 27.
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potential to fail to live up to its basic premise that "[a]ll people with
disabilities must have equal access to the health insurance coverage that
is provided by the employer to all employees."
1 59
IRI. THE POLICY IMPLICATONS OF HIV BENEFIr CAPS
The gaps created by the current law may provide an HIV-infected
person with little or no legal recourse when confronted with a health
benefit cap. Thus, the relevant inquiry shifts to what protections, if any,
should be provided.
Although states have been more responsive to the AIDS crisis than
the federal government,' ° resolution of the current problems requires
assistance from the federal government. Even assuming that states could
avoid ERISA's preemption provision, fHV-infected persons cannot rely
on the states to adequately protect their interests. In this era of increased
competition among the states for revenue, the efforts of one state to
protect HIV-infected persons from such caps would likely be undermined
by other states seeking to attract industry.6'" Likewise, employees
cannot rely on employers to protect their health insurance benefits
because "no matter how concerned an employer might be, its efforts
would be penalized by its competitive disadvantage against less concerned
employers."'" To effectively resolve the issue, Congress must identify
and balance the competing interests of the employer, the employee and
society. In other words, Congress must resolve the policy issues behind
HIV-related health benefit caps.
A. The Employee's Interest
Employees have significant interests in access to health care and
freedom from discrimination. Moreover, the access to health care concern
encompasses a myriad of interests, including reliance on the expectation
of continued health benefit coverage, access to quality health care, and
preservation of financial stability.
1 S. REP. No. 116, supra note 148, at 29.
19 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 3, at 11-12.
' Cf MATrTEw W. FINKIN Er AL., LEGAL PROTCTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE 366 (1989) ('Efforts by some states to protect against [employee health]
hazards were undermined by other states that sought to attract by permitting the
hazards.".
16" Id.
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1. Access to Health Care
One of the primary concerns of an HIV-infected person is the
availability of health care.' To an IRV-infected person, health care
means more than easing pain; it means increasing her life span.'" Such
a person has no right to health care,'65 however, unless she happens to
be economically impoverished.'" Of course, financial impoverishment
often is the case since AIDS and other catastrophic illnesses tend to
destroy the financial viability of sufferers and their families."6
Faced with such a dilemma, the employee is motivated to forego
work in order to qualify for public assistance. Yet a fair assumption
seems to be that employees who were initially diagnosed with HIV before
their employers instituted a cap did not expect such a result.'" This
163 See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
'64American Public Health Association's Amicus Curiae Brief at 12, Greenburg v. H
& H Music, 113 S. Ct. 482 (1992) (No. 91-1283) ("[W]ithout adequate coverage for
health care costs, HIV-infected persons cannot take advantage of medical treatments
necessary to meanigfuly extend their lives.").
" Despite the fact that access to health care is not a right, it is often viewed as such.
See, e.g., Mike McKee, Health Law's Cutting Edge, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1991, at 31,
32 (noting that "society is increasingly beginning to view health-care access as a right,
not a commodity").
66 Entitlement to health care only exists if one qualifies for state-controlled Medicaid
benefits. See id. at 31. However, as President Bush's National Commission on AIDS
declared: "'Medicaid coverage varies widely from state to state, often leaving people with
HIV disease without effective entitlement to care."' Id. (quoting the National Commission
on AIDS). This entitlement, however, depends upon varying state standards. See
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON AIDS, supra note 12, at 73 ("[A]lthough Medicaid is
designed to cover low-income people, it falls short of servicing the needs of many poor
individuals because of the stringent criteria defining 'low-income' and the prerequisite that
assets be below a certain minimum.").
'67 See, e.g., Jay W. Waks, Disabilities Act May Affect Medical Costs, NAT'L L.L,
June 15, 1992, at 18. A poll conducted in the summer of 1991 indicated that one in four
American families had family members afflicted with a catastrophic illness. Id. Of this
group, only thirty-eight percent had adequate insurance coverage. Id.
1" This discussion assumes that there are categorical differences between an employer
capping benefits before a claim is filed and after a claim is filed. See 139 CONG. REC.
E375 (daily ed. Feb. 18, 1993) (remarks by Rep. Hughes) (introducing an amendment to
ERISA that would make it unlawful to eliminate or reduce benefits once a person has
become ill). Although an employee may have relied on future coverage in either situation,
the employee has not really lost anything until her benefits are curtailed for an illness that
she presently has. Therefore, the rest of the discussion assumes that the employer
instituted the health benefit cap after the employee's diagnosis of HIV. Note, however,
that this distinction may not he valid when considering the employee's interest in being
free from discrimination. See infra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
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raises the issue of what role the employee's expectations should play in the
resolution of this crisis.
Professor Leslie Francis recently noted the importance of the employee
expectations of access to health care.169 Professor Francis stated.
On many views of morality, individual autonomy is taken to have moral
significance; and expectations are related to autonomy, in the following
way. Part of what is involved in treating people autonomously is
respecting their ability to make choices and undertake plans. If
expectations are ignored altogether, individuals will not have minimally
stable contexts in which to plan, or minimal assurance that their plans
will be taken seriously .... Expectations do not, can not, and should not
redefine underlying realities. Nonetheless, if people are to be taken
seriously as choosers and planners, it is important at least to open up
the question of whether expectations matter morally under some
circumstances, and why they do.1
70
According to.Francis, an expectation takes on moral significance when the
expectation is reasonable and encouraged by the party who will be held to the
expectation.1
71
After the employee is diagnosed with an illness, should the employer be
forced to recognize the employee's expectation of continued health insurance
coverage? In order to answer this question, one must first consider the
reasonableness of the expectation. Employers offer benefits as away to attract
and retain the most qualified employees. Indeed, existing health insurance
coverage is often stated as a reason why employees remain at a particular
place of employment." This is especially true in situations in which the
employee has a preexisting illness." The fact that benefit plans are
renewed periodically suggests that it may be reasonable to view them as
temporal. However, "many employees throughout the 1970s and early 1980s
experienced almost automatic renewal or moderate changes in their
benefits."'74 As Professor Francis noted:
'9 See Leslie P. Francis, Consumer Expectations and Access to Health Care, 140 U.
PA. L. REv. 1881 (1992).
'70 Id. at 1891.
'7 Id. at 1892-93. Notions of justice, longevity, integrity and consistency with an
underlying theory of rights also support giving weight to one's expectations. Id. at 1897.
" See, e.g., Paul Cotton, Preexisting Conditions "Hold Americans Hostage" to
Employers and Insurance, 265 JAMA 2451, 2453 (1991).
" See, e.g., id (quoting a Blue Cross spokesperson as stating that "[p]reexisting
condition clauses 'cause a lot of people to hang onto jobs because they're scared that if
they switch they will go uncovered for a period of time for the condition they have").
74 Francis, supra note 169, at 1888.
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These employees may have come to expect the continuation of their
employment benefits in roughly the same form as long as their employment
continued, although they had no written contractual rights to the
continuation. Some employers have used this continued availability of
benefits to encourage employee loyalty and longevity of service. 75
The above arguments support finding the employee's expectation in continued
coverage to be reasonable. It should be noted, however, that this
"reasonableness" determination will depend on the circumstances of each
case.176 Consequently, as expectations regarding access to health care
decrease," and public awareness of decisions like McGann78 increase,
the reasonableness of an employee's expectation of continued coverage may
become questionable.
In considering the issue of what role the employer's encouragement plays
in creating expectations, Professor Francis defined the term "encouragemenf'
to include "failures to disabuse someone of beliefs where a disclaimer would
ordinarily be expected.'" Accordingly, encouragement can take a variety
of forms. The usual scenario arises when the employer affirmatively
encourages an employee to retain her expectations that health coverage will
continue. For example, "an employer can encourage an employee to believe
that her employment will not be affected by her expensive health needs by
reassuring her outright that she 'will always have a job as long as he's in
charge.""8  A more difficult situation occurs in situations such as the one
in Owens' where the employer is being forced to review employee
benefits by its insurer. In this situation, should an employer be required to
affirmatively discourage fifutre expectations?" Since the employer is the
primary source of encouragement regarding the availability of employee
benefits, imposing a duty to discourage such expectations may not be an
onerous task"8
175 Id. (footnotes omitted).
76 Id at 1892.
'"7See, e.g., Don Colbum & Richard Morin, Americans Grade Their Health Care,
WASH. PoST, Dec. 31, 1991, at 26 (noting presidential election polls indicating that even
the affluent worry about continued access to health care).
" See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
' Francis, supra note 169, at 1892.
180 Id.
... Owens v. Storehouse, Inc., 984 F.2d 394 (11th Cir. 1993).
' Professor Francis suggests that this, too, constitutes encouragement See Francis,
supra note 169, at 1892.
11 See 139 CONG. REC. E375, supra note 168, at E375 ("Public policy must dictate
that plan sponsors should not offer more to their employees than they intend to
deliver.... Employers must take a realistic look upfixmt at what level of health benefits
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The employee's need for continued health insurance coverage bolsters
the desirability of legal protection to prevent health benefit capping. In
addition to increasing the HIV-infected employee's expected life span,
health care access affects the quality of medical treatment." ' For
instance, an HIV-infected person without health insurance may not be
able to benefit from the prophylactic use of AZT.'85
Another factor to be considered is the HIV-infected employee's lack
of access to other sources of private insurance." As previously
mentioned, underwriting policies often preclude coverage of HIV-infected
persons. Likewise, preexisting condition clauses prevent HIV-infected
employees from leaving one employer for another that offers better
coverage. Thus, the only option for the IV-infected employee faced with
an HIV-related health benefit cap is to rely upon government-funded
health care benefits."s Logic dictates against a public policy decision
that would encourage persons to forego contributing their work product
to society and, instead, to rely upon publicly financed health care.
2. Freedom from Discrimination
HV-infected persons suffer from discrimination as a result of their
illness." Although fear of AIDS, an illness which is incurable and
they can afford to offer and then stand by their promises.'.1 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social
Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and
Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 81 (1993) ("Public and nonprofit hospitals have an
incentive either not to treat or to under-treat the uninsured, and this incentive has its
effects: people without health insurance receive less primary and preventive care than
those who are insured.") (footnote omitted). For a detailed discussion of the differences
in care that insured and uninsur d patients receive, see Jack Hadex, Comparison of
Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients, 263 JAMA 374, 377 (1991).
,' Raymond C. O'Brien, Discrimination: The Difference with AIDS, 6 J. CONT.
HEALTH L. & POL. 96, 96 n.13 (1990) (describing two studies that indicate that AZT
delays progression of AIDS in certain individuals). The preliminary results of a recent
study, however, call into question the prophylactic value of early AZT treatment Naomi
Pfeiffer, Early AZT Efficacy Under Fire, 34 MED. WORLD NEws 54, 56 (1993).
" See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
18 See Schatz, supra note 13, at 1804.
'sSee, e.g., Tracy J. Smith, Comment, AIDS and the Law: Protecting the HIV-
Infected Employee From Discrimination, 57 Tam. L. REv. 539, 540 (1990) ("Despite the
overwhelming evidence that HIV is not transmitted through casual contact, however, the
public remains fearful. This fear has often developed into panic and has sometimes led
to hostility and even violence toward known or suspected IV carriers."); Madelyn C.
Squire, Arbitration ofHealth and &fety Issues in the Workllace: Employees Who Refuse
Work Assignments Because of Fear of Aids Contagion, 44 ME. L. REv. 315, 315-17
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fatal, may be understandable, our system of law should encourage
education, not provide protection for discrimination. Congress recognized
as much when it passed the ADA. Indeed, Congress explicitly declared
that "[i]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who
have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political
powerlessness."' 89 Furthermore, a 1988 study by Harvard University
researchers noted:
Twenty-nine percent of people surveyed favored tattooing HLY-
positive persons, seventeen percent supported banishing people with
AIDS to islands to live in colonies like lepers and thirty percent
believed people with AIDS should be isolated at work and school.
Twenty percent believed that people with AIDS were "getting their
ightful due!""9
Discrimination against HN-infected persons has taken many
forms. 9 ' For example, HIV-infected persons "have been denied medical
care and city services; prohibited from attending school; fired from their
jobs; evicted from their homes; abandoned by their families and even
denied proper funeral services."'" The proper role of government
should be to provide information and education so as to alleviate the
underlying fears motivating such discrimination and prevent the further
spread of the disease.'93
IV-infected persons also experience discrimination as a result of
perceived sexual orientation.1" This is largely because the majority of
(1992) (noting the misconceptions regarding HIV and the abuse suffered by its victims
despite widespread information regarding the AIDS virus).
a 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. I1 1991).
Dunlap, supra note 3, at 915 (citing Blendon & Donelan, Discrimination Against
People with AIDS: The Public's Perspective, 319 NEW ENG. L MED. 1022, 1026 (1988)).
Some of this discrimination results from disapproval of the HIV-infected person's actual
or presumed sexual orientation. See Joan Vogel, Containing Medical and Disability Costs
by Cutting Unhealthy Employees: Does Section 510 of ER1SA Provide a Remedy?, 62
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1024, 1030-31 (1987).
191 See Dunlap, supra note 3, at 913 ('Tear of people with AIDS has materialized in
every public forun and institution in this society, in virtually every context imaginable").
'n Smith, supra note 188, at 541 (footnotes omitted).
' See Brown, supra note 3, at 19.
See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that homosexuals have been subjected to a history of
discrimination); Schatz, supra note 13, at 1786-88. For instance, in post World War H
Switzerland, homosexuals '"vere sometimes given the choice by their employers of
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AIDS cases in the United States have involved homosexual or bisexual
men.195 Notwithstanding the fact that most states do not regard either
homosexuals or bisexuals as a protected class for equal protection
challenges, 196 our legal system should strive to limit sexual orientation
discrimination. For as one commentator concluded, sexual orientation
discrimination also
threatens to drive gay and bisexual men back into the closet. Although
such a result may be ideologically pleasing to some, its implications are
medically disastrous. A climate of homophobia deters frank discussion
with physicians and discourages people frm seeking out AIDS
prevention information that may "implicate" them as gay or
bisexual." 7
Courts have recognized that the law must discourage discrimination
against H1V-infected persons!9 This recognition is apparent in the
judicial expansion of the definitions of "disability" and "handicap" to
include AIDS when constructing employment discrimination statutes. 199
castration or loss of job and pension." Geoffrey I Giles, "The Most Unkindest Cut of
All" Castration, Homosexuality and Nazi Justice, 27 1 CONTEMP. HIST. 41, 57 (1992)
(footnote omitted).
'" See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DEPARrmENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, HIV/AIDS SURVEIILANCE, U.S. AIDS CASES REPORTED THROUGH MAY 1990,
at 8 (June 1990).
196 See Smith, supra note 188, at 563. Likewise, many federal courts have relied upon
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), "to reject federal equal protection challenges
to statutes that discriminate against gays." Shirley A. Wiegand & Sara Farr, Part of the
Moving Stream: Sftate Constitutional Law, Sodomy, and Beyond, 81 KY. L.I 449, 463
(1992-93). Courts reach this result despite the fact that Hardwick stands for the
proposition that homosexual activity is not a fundamental right subject to substantive due
process protection. Id.
'7 Schatz, supra note 13, at 1788. A recent survey of gay and bisexual men that was
conducted in Canada has found support for this premise. Ted Myers et al., Factors
Affecting Gay and Bisexual Men's Decisions and Intentions to Seek LEN Testing, 83 AM.
J. PUB. HEALTH 701 (1993). Of the reasons given for not being tested for the HIV
antibody, the motivation of 76.8% of the men surveyed was a desire for anonymity. Id.
at 702. More specifically, most subjects cited a desire to avoid any governmental list of
HI-infected persons "and a concern that a positive result could adversely affect their
careers and/or insurance. Id. at 703 (table 1).
" See, e.g., Chalk v. United States Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1988).
t9 See id.; Local 1812, American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Department of State,
662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that an HIV-infected person can be
handicapped within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3905(e)(4));
Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist, 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(holding that a child infected with AIDS was "handicapped"); Raytheon Co. v. California
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Likewise, with the passage of the ADA, Congress recognized the need to
protect HIV-infected persons from discrimination.2' Accordingly, "[t]he
legal system must be approached with an eye not only to the basic
priority that the HIV pandemic must be ended to save lives, but also to
its obligation to protect people from mistreatment that the reaction to HIV
has so widely mobilized." ''
Decisions like McGann2' and Owens 3 fail to heed this advice.
Rather, they lend approbation to beliefs that the discrimination directed
at HIV-infected persons is acceptable. It appears that the public's
acceptance of discrimination against HIV-infected persons stems from a
distaste for homosexual lifestyles. In fact, the .question arises whether the
result in cases like McGann and Owens would be the same if the
employer limited health care benefits for cancer, a disease that
disproportionately affects the African-American population2'
B. The Employer's Interests
The costs of HIV and other catastrophic illnesses can be equally
devastating to employers who provide health insurance as part of their
benefits package. 2"5 This is especially so in this era of skyrocketing
health care costs' There is no doubt that economic viability of the
organization is rightfully the primary interest of the employer.
Consequently, as long as costs are not employed as a pretext to pass
moral judgments on the employee, there is no moral "bad guy" when the
employer restricts benefits in order to maintain economic viability.
However, economic realities suggest that employers may be imposing
health benefits caps on HIV-infected persons for reasons other than health
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 212 Cal. App. 3d 1242, 1248-49 (Ct. App. 1989)
('AIDS thus falls squarely within the physical handicap coverage of the Act.); Cronan
v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 179 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at D-1 (Aug. 15, 1986)
(interpreting Massachusetts' fair employment law).
2 See supra text accompanying note 190.
20' Dunlap, supra note 3, at 930.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 37-62.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 63-117.
204 Paul Sorlie, Black-White Mortality Diff'erences by Family Income, 340 LANCEr 346
(1992).
"0 See, e.g., Waks, supra note 167, at 18.
2w See U.S. Health Costs Expected to Reach $939.9 Billion in 1993, Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) 3, at D-5 (Jan. 6, 1993). Health care costs in 1993 are expected to
reach $939.9 billion. This would involve a 12.1% increase of 1992 health care
expenditures. Id.
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care costs. For instance, Robert Padgug, director of health care policy for
Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield of New York, notes that AIDS
accounted for only three percent of the company's total medical care
expenditures0 7 Indeed, the cost of AIDS is not particularly exorbitant
when compared to other health care costs.2 8 When one considers that
the costs associated with one premature baby can be as high as
$300,000,2' the costs associated with AIDS (approximately $85,000)
do not seem to be too high."
Likewise, there are more equitable methods to cut costs than to
discriminate against persons afflicted by a particular illness. For instance,
the employer could put a cap on all health care benefits.2 This would
spread an individual employee's risk of loss across all employees, thus
allowing a higher claims cap and reducing the individual employee's
possible losses. Likewise, increased employee contributions could be used
to offset the employer's costs. Furthermore, the employer could choose to
not offer any health care benefits and thereby not encourage an
employee's expectations of coverage 2
The available nondiscriminatory alternatives, when coupled with the
relative costs of AIDS, suggest that employers set HIV-related health
benefits caps for reasons other than cost savings! 3 Two possible
reasons come to mind: (1) the employer is expressing moral reservations
about employees with AIDS. 4 or (2) the employer associates AIDS
with life style choices and believes that the employee should bear the
costs of these choices. 15
As previously stated, an employer's moral admonition of persons with
AIDS by capping AIDS-related benefits amounts to discrimination against
m Mike McKee, On the Brink; LEGAL TMEs, Nov. 18, 1991, at 31.
2 See sura text accompanying notes 9 & 153.
See Waks, supra note 167, at 18.
210 One should note, however, that even an $85,000 claim could be devastating to a
small, self-insured employer. Larger employers can use various methods to better spread
the risk of loss than smaller employers. For instance, an increased employee contribution
would go farther to reduce the costs of a large employer than a small employer.
2" See supra note 152.
12 See supra notes 169-83 and accompanying text.
2 The author realizes that this is a generalization and recognizes that it is possible
that an employer may have cut AIDS-related benefits because this was the only
catastrophic illness currently seeking coverage.
214 See Brown, supra note 3, at 17.
21
1 See Kenneth E. Labowitz, The Coming of Conditional Health Insurance, LEGAL
TIMEs, Nov. 16, 1992, at 27 (noting that one implication of the McGann decision is "that
employers can cut health-care costs by conditioning coverage upon employees' personal
habits or patterns of behavior, such as diet, smoking, and exercise").
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HIV-infected persons."6  Clearly, the law should discourage this
behavior 17 Indeed, access to health care should be value-neutral.
An employer's conditioning coverage on the employee's supposed life
style choice poses a more difficult issue. As one commentator noted, "As
there are personal behaviors that, if altered, would significantly reduce
health risks and therefore the likelihood of claims ... [t]here is a
simplistic logic in the [premise] ... that an employer is not obligated to
bear blindly the expense of all covered employees for all illnesses and
conditions."2 "8 Indeed, for some time employers have sought to reduce
the health care costs associated with smoking.2"9 Such measures have
generally enjoyed public supportL ° Hence, an employer is beyond
reproach for considering an employee's sexual life style, that is, one's
sexual orientation, in providing insurance coverage unless such factors
can be distinguished from considering the employee's smoking. One may
attempt to distinguish sexual life style factors from smoking by arguing
that a person's sexual orientation is not a choice."1 Cigarette smoking
is, however, addictive and, therefore, the smoker may not have a choice
in the popular sense of the word.' Yet, there is a growing body of
scientific research indicating that male sexual orientation is a product of
genetic inheritance.'
Society may distinguish the two cases based on its own legitimate
goals. For instance, one aspect of discrimination against persons infected
with HIV has been an innocent/guilty dichotomy of victims a4
"Innocent" victims of HIV include children and persons who contracted
216 See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
a Labowitz, supra note 216, at 27. One response to such reasoning is that, taken to
its logical extreme, almost all illnesses are the "result of our respective lifestyles or that
of our parents." Robert R. Gregory, McGann Ruling Outrageous, Fein View Flawed,
LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 14, 1992, at 34 (letter to the editor).
29 See Vogel, supra note 191, at 1036-38.
' See Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad
Public Policy?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 940, 947 (1987).
ni See Wiegand & Farr, supra note 197, at 457 n.49 (relating the expert testimony
of Dr. Martin Weinberg, coauthor of the Kinsey Report on Homosexuals, asserting that
homosexuality is not a choice nor a preference).
" See Vogel, supra note 191, at 1037.
3 See, e.g., Dean H. Hammer et al., A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation, 261 SCIENCE 321, 325 (1993). This study of
114 families of homosexual males resulted in a statistical confidence level of more than
ninety-nine percent that at least one subtype of male sexual orientation is genetically
influenced. Id.
2 See Brown, supra note 3, at 15.
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the virus through a blood transfusion. "Guilty" victims include gays,
intravenous drug users and prostitutes Willie Brown, then Assembly
Speaker of the California Legislature, recognized that such
characterizations hinder control of the disease by encouraging people not
to seek advice regarding the treatment and transmission of HIV.r2
Furthermore, there is something distasteful and particularly "un-
American!' about allowing employers free reign into the private lives of
their employees.
In conclusion, while employers have a strong and legitimate interest
in reducing the costs of insurance coverage, there are available
alternatives to disease-specific caps that impose less social costs.
Widespread discrimination against HiV-infected persons suggests that
employers often institute HIV-related benefit caps for reasons unrelated
to cost reduction. For this reason, the employer should have the burden
of proving that such caps are instituted to control costs. Furthermore,
interests in educating the public about HIV and in controlling its spread
dictate that sexual orientation life style factors are not legitimate methods
of risk classification.
C. The Public's Interest
Courts have long recognized the public's interest in insurance.l
Indeed, in the early twentieth century, life insurers invoked this interest
in support of their argument that they" should be exempt from
taxation. This interest is farther acknowledged by the incentives
provided to employers to encourage their providing of insurance coverage
for their employees '  These considerations led Professor Leah
Wortham to conclude the following:
This combination of necessity and public choice creates an obligation
on behalf of society to be concerned about the legitimacy of the
classification schemes used by insurers to decide who can buy
insurance, how much it will cost, and who will be covered.... [This]
=s Id.
2M Id.
27Md. at 15-16.
2 See, e.g., Gennan Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 408 (1914) (upholding
a state's right to regulate insurance due to its close relation to the public interest).
m See Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification. Too Important to Be Left to the
Actuaries, 19 J. L. REFoRM 349, 394 (1986).
230 See Id at 397-98.
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
leads one .. to the more important issue of availability of coverage:
Can people buy the insurance they need? 2
As previously discussed, IV-related insurance caps have the
appearance of being motivated by reasons other than cost
containment. 2  This suggests that such a classification scheme is not
legitimate. Therefore, society has an interest in preventing such
classifications. In other words, the gap in insurance availability for HIV-
infected persons should be closede
3
Economic arguments also support closing this gap. For instance,
allowing employers to shift the costs of HIV-related illness to the public
adds stress to an already burdened system. As previously mentioned,
AIDS has undergone a "Medicaidization." ' Although Medicaid's
financing of HIV-related health benefits has increased from twenty-five
percent in 1984-85 to forty-one percent in 1986-87, private insurance
funding has decreased from forty-nine percent to forty-three percent over
the same period?5  This shift in the health care cost burden becomes
more troublesome when one considers that the total Medicaid budget
increased by thirty-three percent from 1988 to 1990.? Further, in 1989,
employee HlIV-related health care claims totaled $455 million 7 and the
estimated total cost of caring for persons with lIV was $5.81 billion in
1991?" The true aggregate cost-shifting that occurs cannot be
accurately and definitively measured because not all cases and costs are
reported and these figures are estimates, which are not adjusted for
inflation. 9 Yet, these figures illustrate that a mass shifting of AIDS-
related costs would increase Medicaid's total AIDS-related costs
significantly. Coupled with non-Medicaid budget pressures and increased
231 Id. at 400.
23 See supra notes 208-16 and accompanying text.
m "Gap in availability" is Professor Wortham's language. Wortham, supra note 230,
at 401.
See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
s Green & Amo, supra note 17, at 1261.
21 HEALTH INSURANCE AssoCIAnoN OF AMERICA, SOURCE BOOK OF HEALTH
INSURANCE DATA 43 (1991).
-7 Fred J. Hellinger, Forecasting the Medical Care Cost of the HiVEpidemic: 1991-
1994, 28 INQUIRY 213, 223 (1991).
23 Id. Hellinger forecasts that the total health care costs of HIV-related treatment will
be $10.389 billion by 1994. Id.
" Likewise, the 1989 figures are thought to be less than actually expended. See
Christine Woolsey, AIDS Claims Hit $1 Billion, Bus. INS., Oct. 29, 1990, at* 4.
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public concern about the budget deficit these figures indicate that the
public has an interest in preventing employers from instituting HIV-
related health benefit caps.
CONCLUSION
McGann and Owens raise serious policy issues. Not only do they
highlight that ERISA only provides minimal protection for employee
health benefit plans, but they also emphasize the gaps in the ADA
through which any employee may fall. Under existing law, any
employee's health insurance can be capped.
Americans have certain expectations about their access to medical
care. At the very least, it is thought to be more than a mere commodity.
As long as these expectations are encouraged by employers as reasonable,
our legal system must protect these expectations. This is especially true
in a situation in which an employer institutes insurance caps after the
employee has been stricken by the illness. At the very least, then,
Representative Hughes' proposed amendment to ERISA should be passed
to provide this protection. 4
Although employers may have legitimate reasons for limiting disease-
specific coverage, doing so raises concerns about discrimination against
HIV-infected persons. The legality of such caps only lends credibility to
such discrimination. One method of ascertaining the legitimacy of an
employer's stated reasons for health insurance caps is to place the burden
of persuasion on the employer to show that the cost concerns are not a
pretext. Likewise, an employer should be required to institute more
equitable cost-saving mechanisms before instituting disease-specific
benefit caps.
America is facing a health care crisis. Decisions like McGann
illustrate that America's health care system is in dire need of repair.
Something is fundamentally wrong with an insurance system that fails to
provide coverage for those individuals that most need it. This health care
crisis affects consumers, insurers, employers, and state and federal
governments. Societal interests dictate that employers should not be
allowed to shrug off their responsibility so as to increase the
government's burden. To do so would undermine any sense of stability
workers currently have. Instead, the government must restructure access
20 See supra note 168.
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to health care so as to control costs and spread the burden of providing
health care to all interested parties 241
Thomas E. Bartrum*
1 In researching tis Note, the author often returned to the words of Albert Camus:
A pestilence isn't a thing made to man's measure; therefore we tell ourselves
that pestilence is a mere bogy of the mmd, a bad dream that will pass away.
But it doesn't always pass away and, from one bad dream to another, it is men
who pass away. They went on doing business, arranged for journeys, and
formed views. How should they have given a thought to anything like plague,
which rules out any future, cancels journeys, silences the exchange of views.
They fancied themselves free, and no one will ever be free so long as them are
pestilences.
ALBERT CAMUS, THE PLAGUE 36 (Gilbert trans., 1979).
* Thomas Bartrum, who received Ins J.D. from the Umversity of Kentucky m 1993,
is currently corporate counsel for American Practice Risk Assessment Corporation of
Louisville, Kentucky. The author would like to express his gratitude to Mary J. Davis,
Professor of Law at the Umversity of Kentucky, for her insightful comments and
encouragement. The author dedicates this Note to the memory of Robin Ward, whose
journey was cut short by AIDS.
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